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Notes
SHOT DOWN!: THE D.C. CIRCUIT DISARMS GUN CONTROL LAWS
IN PARKER v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
"[T] here are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the
people, by gradual and silent encroachment of those in power, than by
violent and sudden usurpations."'
I. INTRODUCTION
When James Madison spoke these words, he likely would have been
alarmed to know that courts would refuse to recognize an individual's
right to keep and bear arms, a right understood by early Americans as one
of the most essential safeguards of liberty.2 During its march through the
centuries, the Second Amendment has developed into an enigma law
schools hardly acknowledge, legal scholars rarely discuss and gun owners
frequently hide behind.3 Despite the fact that the United States is the
1. James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention in Defense of
the Constitution (June 6, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 87 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1907) (1828).
2. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REF-
ERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 300 (Jon Roland ed.,
Constitution Soc'y 2003) (1803) (asserting "whenever standing armies are kept up,
and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext
whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of de-
struction"). An armed citizenry ensured that the people would not be oppressed
by a tyrannical government. See, e.g.,JosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 708-09 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (ex-
pressing fear that deterioration of militia would undermine Second Amendment's
protection). In 1833, Justice Joseph Story said:
[T]he right of the citizens to keep, and bear arms has justly been consid-
ered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong
moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the peo-
ple to resist, and triumph over them.
Id. (commenting on Second Amendment's importance).
3. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A robust
constitutional debate is currently taking place in this nation regarding the scope of
the Second Amendment .... Until recently, this relatively obscure constitutional
provision attracted little judicial or scholarly attention."); Brannon P. Denning,
Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller
and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 999 (1995) (arguing federal courts
have participated in "constitutional gymnastics" to avoid interpreting Second
Amendment to protect individual's right). See generally DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 353-54 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2005) (1991) (devoting
four brief paragraphs to discussion of Second and Third Amendments together);
(353)
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most heavily armed country with the highest firearm-related death rates
when compared to its economic counterparts around the world-or per-
haps because of it-the Supreme Court has avoided defining the scope of
the people's right to keep and bear arms. 4
Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REv. 1,
19 (1996) [hereinafter Lund, Past and Future] ("[T]here is little evidence to sug-
gest that the Second Amendment has had any significant role in preserving the
right to arms in our country."); Christopher Chrisman, Note, Constitutional Struc-
ture and the Second Amendment: A Defense of the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms,
43 Aiuz. L. REv. 439, 441 (2001) (noting Second Amendment is largely dismissed
by prominent legal scholars and many constitutional law treatises devote little
space to discussion of Second Amendment).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 104344 (8th Cir. 2004)
(concluding Second Amendment protects individual's right to keep and bear arms
only when possession is reasonably related to preservation of well regulated mili-
tia), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005); Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1056 (finding Second
Amendment does not guarantee individual's right to own or possess arms), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003); United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th
Cir. 2001) (determining federal criminal gun control law does not violate Second
Amendment unless law impairs state's ability to maintain militia), cert. denied, 536
U.S. 907 (2002); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding Second Amendment protects individual's right to keep and bear arms),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir.
1997) (rejecting gun owner's claim that federal statute prohibiting transfer or pos-
session of machine guns violated gun owner's Second Amendment right because
gun owner did not show that possession of machine guns had connection with
militia), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100-01 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding gun owner lacked standing to sue for violation of Second
Amendment because Second Amendment does not protect possession of weapon
by private citizen), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120,
124 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding Second Amendment preserves collective right of
keeping and bearing arms that bear "reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well regulated militia" (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 178 (1939))), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695
F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding Second Amendment does not apply to
states), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387
(10th Cir. 1977) (rejecting gun owner's claim that federal statute, which prohib-
ited possession of unregistered machine gun, violated gun owner's Second Amend-
ment right because machine gun had no connection to militia, even though gun
owner was member of Kansas militia), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) ("It is clear that the Second
Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right."), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 948 (1976); Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610, 610 (3d Cir.
1973) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)) ("[T]he right to keep and bear arms is
not a right given by the United States Constitution."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839
(1973); see also Anthony Gallia, Comment, "Your Weapons, You Will not Need Them."
Comment on the Supreme Court's Sixty-Year Silence on the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 33
AKRON L. REv. 131, 132-33 (1999) ("[T]he conflict surrounding the Second
Amendment has yet to be resolved."); U.S. is the World's Most Heavily Armed Society,
ME. ANTIQUE DIG., Oct. 2007, at 19A (stating United States citizens own
270,000,000 of world's 875,000,000 firearms); Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 2 (Aug.
24, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.pdf (explaining recent
interpretations of Second Amendment "have been characterized by disagreement
and uncertainty"); Special Committee on Gun Violence, Am. Bar Assoc., The U.S.
Compared to Other Nations, http://www.abanet.org/gunviol/factsaboutgunviolence/
uscompared.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2008) (noting rate of death from firearms
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss2/3
The Second Amendment provides that "a well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms shall not be infringed."5 Although the majority of Ameri-
cans believe the Constitution provides individuals with the right to possess
a gun, the Court has yet to directly speak to whether the Second Amend-
ment protects a right belonging to individuals, or only to members of a
militia or a military organization. 6 The development of Second Amend-
ment jurisprudence has occurred primarily at the federal appellate level,
and federal courts have held almost uniformly that the Second Amend-
ment protects a right belonging only to members of a militia.7 With little
guidance from the Court, however, the federal circuits disagree on the
scope of the Second Amendment's protection, and have applied different
standards when addressing Second Amendment claims.
8
in United States is eight times higher than rates in its economic equivalents in
world). But see Miller, 307 U.S. at 177, 183 (addressing Second Amendment chal-
lenge to section of National Firearms Act). See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at
353 (observing Supreme Court has never "dealt extensively" with Second Amend-
ment). The Supreme Court's silence on the Second Amendment's protections
may reflect the Court's perception of the Second Amendment as bad public policy.
See, e.g., Denning, supra note 3, at 1002 (concluding Supreme Court's reluctance to
approach Second Amendment cases honestly and directly illustrates Court's view
of Second Amendment as bad public policy).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. II (granting people right to keep and bear arms). Un-
like most other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment has not
been incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Parker v.
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 391 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (observing Second
Amendment as "one of the few Bill of Rights provisions that has not yet been held
to be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment"), cert. granted in part sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.).
6. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1061 (noting Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
Second Amendment's scope is limited); Roland Docal, Comment, The Second, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments-The Precarious Protectors of the American Gun Collector, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1101, 1117 (1996) (observing anti-gun advocates perceive Supreme
Court's silence on issue as approval of gun control legislation, whereas pro-gun
advocates interpret Court's silence as recognition of individual's right to keep and
bear arms); Gordon Witkin et al., The Fight to Bear Arms, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP.,
May 22, 1995, at 29 (discussing poll taken in 1995 where 75% of Americans an-
swered individuals have constitutional right to own gun). But cf Burton v. Sills,
394 U.S. 812, 812 (1969) (per curiam) (dismissing gun owner's appeal based on
lack of substantial federal question of NewJersey Supreme Court holding that Sec-
ond Amendment permits regulation of firearms as long as regulation does not
impair active, organized militias of states).
7. See David A. Lieber, Comment, The Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring
Rationale for Excluding the Second Amendment from the Court's Modern Incorporation Doc-
trine, 95J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1079, 1097 (2005) (noting federal courts typi-
cally uphold federal gun regulations against Second Amendment challenges).
8. See Denning, supra note 3, at 999-1000 (arguing federal courts have not
accurately applied holding of Miller and have taken different approaches to avoid
construing Second Amendment to apply to individuals). But see RobertJ. Spitzer,
The Second Amendment "Right to Bear Arms" and United States v. Emerson, 77 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 18 (2003) (arguing federal courts have "uniformly embraced the
collective interpretation of the Second Amendment as the central conclusion of
Miller'). For a discussion of the various standards federal courts have used when
20081 NOTE
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Since 1939, federal courts have cited United States v. Miller,9 the only
Supreme Court case interpreting specifically the Second Amendment in
the twentieth century, for some version of the proposition that the Second
Amendment prohibits only laws that interfere with the preservation of a
well regulated militia. 10 Unfortunately, a number of commentators have
concluded Miller provides minimal guidance as to whose right the Second
addressing Second Amendment claims, see infra notes 56-74 and accompanying
text.
9. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
10. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1066 (finding Second Amendment protects peo-
ple's right to maintain state militia and does not establish individual's right to pos-
sess firearms for personal use); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 711
(7th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of individual's Second Amendment claim
where individual did not demonstrate nexus between statute's restriction of fire-
arms and operation of state militias); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273
(11th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing Miller interpreted Second Amendment to protect
possession or use of weapon that is reasonably related to militia); United States v.
Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing Miller required reasonable rela-
tionship between possession or use of weapon and activity related to militia); Hick-
man v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding Second Amendment
does not protect possession of weapon by individual); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d
120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting Second Amendment confers collective right of
keeping arms that bear reasonable relationship to preservation or efficiency of well
regulated militia); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992) (de-
termining individual's possession of arms was not related to preservation or effi-
ciency of militia); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982)
(determining right to bear arms is "inextricably connected" to preservation of mili-
tia); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 66 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (inter-
preting Second Amendment as guaranteeing member of militia's right to keep
and bear arms); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (find-
ing Second Amendment's purpose as stated in Millerwas to preserve effectiveness
of state militia); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (explain-
ing Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms applies only to right of state
to maintain militia and not to right of individual to bear arms); United States v.
Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (rejecting individual's claim that fed-
eral statute, which prohibited transporting firearm in interstate commerce after
having been convicted of felony, violated Second Amendment because individual
did not show federal statute affected maintenance of well regulated militia); Eckert
v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610, 610 (3d Cir. 1973) (finding right to keep and
bear arms is not right given by Constitution); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916,
922-23 (1st Cir. 1942) (rejecting individual's Second Amendment challenge where
individual was not member of military organization and individual's use of weapon
was not in preparation for military career); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266
(3d Cir. 1942) (rejecting individual's Second Amendment challenge where federal
statute, which prohibited individual from receiving weapons from interstate com-
merce, did not infringe upon preservation of well regulated militia), rev'd on other
grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). But see Parker, 478 F.3d at 395 (determining Second
Amendment protects individual's right to keep and bear arms that ensures individ-
uals have arms when called for militia service), cert. granted in part sub nom. District
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (declaring Miller supports interpretation of Sec-
ond Amendment as protecting individual's right to keep and bear arms, even
when individual is not member of militia or engaged in military service). See gener-
ally Hickman, 81 F.3d at 101 n.5 (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8
(1980)) (emphasizing Supreme Court has not interpreted Second Amendment
356 [Vol. 53: p. 353
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Amendment actually protects." As a result, there has been disagreement
among the federal circuits and legal analysts regarding whether the Sec-
ond Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms or
protects only the right of members of the militia to keep and bear arms. 12
since Miller, except to cite Miller for proposition that federal restrictions on use of
firearms by individuals do not violate constitutionally protected liberties).
11. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.1 (1997) (ThomasJ.,
concurring) ("In Miller... the Court did not ... attempt to define, or otherwise
construe, the substantive right protected by the Second Amendment."); Parker, 478
F.3d at 393 (illustrating Miller only examined what arms Second Amendment pro-
tects, not collective or individual aspect of right), cert. granted in part sub nom. Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1061
(asserting Miller "stands only for the proposition that possession of certain weapons
is not protected"); Denning, supra note 3, at 974 ("[T]he Supreme Court's deci-
sion was based more on an absence of evidence in the record than any searching
inquiry into the origin and development of the Second Amendment."); Lieber,
supra note 7, at 1080 ("Since its decision in United States v. Miller, however, the
Court has neither endorsed the appropriate interpretive approach nor expounded
on the precise nature of the right conferred under the Second Amendment."). See
generally Cases, 131 F.2d at 922 (emphasizing difficulty of establishing general rule
applicable to all Second Amendment challenges); Carl T. Bogus, What Does the
Second Amendment Restrict? A Collective Rights Analysis, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 516
(2001) ("The Second Amendment sets forth a principle, not a formula. The pa-
rameters of the right can only sensibly be mapped on a case by case basis"); Lund,
Past and Future, supra note 3, at 3 (proposing technological advances in weapons
since eighteenth century demonstrate need for creation of legal distinctions Fram-
ers did not consider); Chrisman, supra note 3, at 439 ("[M]uch confusion contin-
ues to surround the nature of the Second Amendment, confusion that has only
been exacerbated by the courts' reluctance to examine the issue."); Gallia, supra
note 4, at 134 (recognizing Miller did not discuss substantive right of Second
Amendment).
12. See, e.g., Parker, 478 F.3d at 379 (discussing individual right and collective
right theories of Second Amendment), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.). While the collective right theory
and the individual right theory are the two leading views, some scholars have devel-
oped alternative theories that fall somewhere between the two. See, e.g., Emerson,
270 F.3d at 219 (noting, under "sophisticated collective rights" view, Second
Amendment guarantees right to keep and bear arms to members of organized
state militia who bear arms while participating in militia only if federal and state
governments do not provide arms for service). Under this theory, individuals
could be completely disarmed because the only modern organized, active militia is
the National Guard, and the National Guard is armed by the federal government.
See id. (setting forth sophisticated collective rights model). See generally ELLEN AL-
DERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN AcTION 97
(William Morrow & Co. 1991) (1990) (noting scholars who usually favor narrow
reading of Constitution believe Second Amendment should be interpreted
broadly, whereas scholars who typically advocate broad protection for individual
rights believe Second Amendment applies to federal government's right to raise
militia and does not guarantee individual's right to keep and bear arms). For a
discussion of the collective right theory and the individual right theory, see infra
notes 33-43 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the sophisticated
collective rights model, see Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth
Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995, 1003-04 (1995) (book review) (explaining that,
under sophisticated collective right view, Second Amendment protects individual's
ownership and use of arms, but only to extent ownership of arms is related to
maintaining militia).
5
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During the 1970s and the 1980s, legal scholars generally agreed the Sec-
ond Amendment did not protect an individual's right to keep and bear
arms, although the Executive branch has supported different interpreta-
tions of the Second Amendment over the years.1 3
Recently, many academics and government officials have concluded
the Second Amendment protects a right belonging to individuals, and is
not limited to individuals who serve in the militia. 14 In United States v.
13. See, e.g., David T. Hardy, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and
The Origin of Gun Control in America, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1237, 1239 (2007)
(book review) (observing by 1970s, collective right theory was predominant view of
Second Amendment); Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 6 (observing legisla-
tion signed by President Roosevelt in 1941 concerned registration of firearms "pos-
sessed by any individual for his personal protection or sport" and prohibited
infringement of "the right of any individual to keep and bear arms"). In 1959, the
Office of Legal Counsel reviewed a bill that would have involved the disposition of
rockets, missiles and earth satellites and determined there would be constitutional
problems under the Second Amendment if the bill prohibited private individuals
from possessing ammunition for firearms. See Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note
4, at 7 (implying Second Amendment protects individual's right). Several years
later, however, the Justice Department advanced the collective right theory of the
Second Amendment. See id. (noting congressional testimony in 1965 supported
collective right theory).
14. See Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., spe-
cially concurring) (arguing Ninth Circuit was incorrect in Hickman to hold Second
Amendment does not protect individual's right, and Ninth Circuit should have,
instead, followed Emerson and adopted individual right view); Hale, 978 F.2d at
1021 (Beam, J., concurring) (rejecting idea that Miller held Congress has power to
prohibit individual from possessing firearm); Brief for the United States in Opposi-
tion to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19 n.3, United States v. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (No. 01-8780) (noting current position of United States is
that Second Amendment broadly protects right of individuals to possess firearms,
and is not limited to members of militia or individuals engaged in military training
or service); Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 76 ("The Second Amendment
unambiguously and irrefutably establishes an individual right to keep and bear
arms"); Chrisman, supra note 3, at 463 (arguing Second Amendment recognizes
individual's right); HaroldJ. Krent, AllAmendments Were Created Equal, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Apr. 25, 1998, at 6 (explaining many academics recently determined Sec-
ond Amendment protects individual ownership of arms and reasoned, in part, that
"the people" refers to individual rights elsewhere in Constitution); Adam Liptak,
Revised View of 2nd Amendment is Cited as Defense in Gun Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2002, at Al (discussing Justice Department's view that Second Amendment pro-
tects individual's right to own gun); Libby Quaid, Giuliani 7ies to Explain Past to
'Extremist' NRA, COURIER-POST, Sept. 22, 2007, at 9A (discussing Republican Rudy
Giuliani's agreement with recent federal court ruling overturning ban on private
ownership of handguns in District of Columbia); Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra
note 4, at 2 (stating Attorney General's opinion that Second Amendment guaran-
tees right of individual to keep and bear arms); Memorandum from the Office of
the Attorney General to all United States Attorneys (Nov. 9, 2001), http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/emerson.htm ("In my view, the Emerson opinion,
and the balance it strikes, generally reflect the correct understanding of the Sec-
ond Amendment."). But see United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (8th
Cir. 2004) (determining Second Amendment protects individual's right to keep
and bear arms only when possession is reasonably related to preservation of well
regulated militia).
[Vol. 53: p. 353
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Emerson,1 5 the Fifth Circuit became the first federal court to hold that the
Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and bear
arms. 16 Some federal court decisions after Emerson, however, have held
the Second Amendment does not protect an individual's right.17 In 2007,
in Parker v. District of Columbia,1 8 the D.C. Circuitjoined the Fifth Circuit in
holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep
and bear arms, and became the first federal appeals court in history to
strike down gun control ordinances as unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment. 19
15. 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
16. Compare id. at 260 (holding Second Amendment protects right belonging
to individuals), with Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1066 (finding Second Amendment does
not guarantee individual's right to keep and bear firearms for personal use),
United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding Second
Amendment does not guarantee individual's right to bear arms), Gillespie v. City
of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding Second Amendment
"establishes no right to possess a firearm apart from the role possession of a gun
might play in maintaining a state militia"), Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th
Cir. 1995) (holding Second Amendment does not guarantee individual's right to
bear firearm), and Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (de-
termining Second Amendment's right applies only to state militias). State courts
also disagree on whether the Second Amendment protects an individual's right or
a right belonging only to members of a militia. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 380 n.6
(noting at least seven state appellate courts have held Second Amendment pro-
tects individual's right while ten state appellate courts have found Second Amend-
ment protects only right of members of militia to keep and bear arms), cert. granted
in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.). For a
discussion of state constitutional provisions that provide a right to keep and bear
arms, see Lieber, supra note 7, at 1115-20.
17. See, e.g., Nordyke, 319 F.3d at 1191 (reaffirming Ninth Circuit's view that
Second Amendment protects only collective right for states to maintain militia).
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged, however, that the Fifth Circuit thoroughly re-
viewed the Second Amendment's history in Emerson, and opined that it would also
recognize an individual's right to keep and bear arms if the Ninth Circuit had not
already endorsed the collective right view in its previous cases. See id. ("[I]f we
were writing on a blank slate, we may be inclined to follow the approach of the
Fifth Circuit in Emerson"). Additionally, the special concurrence argued that main-
taining an armed citizenry may be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at
1193 n.3 (Gould, J., specially concurring) (explaining Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause protects liberties "deeply rooted" in nation's history and im-
plicit in concept of ordered liberty).
18. 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.).
19. See id. at 395 (holding Second Amendment protects individual's right to
keep and bear arms). For a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's rationale for its deci-
sion, see infra notes 84-116 and accompanying text. But see Brady Center to Pre-
vent Gun Violence, Decision by Eraser: How the Parker Court Obliterated Half of the
Second Amendment 1, 5 (2007), http://www.gunlawsuits.org/defend/second/fan-
tasy/pdf/parker-opinion-citique2.pdf (arguing D.C. Circuit's opinion in Parker
was based on inaccurate assumptions). See generally Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98,
101 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting no individual has ever successfully demonstrated injury
to interest protected by Second Amendment in federal court).
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This Note discusses the development of Second Amendment jurispru-
dence since Miller and concludes that Parker is, in fact, consistent with
Miller.20 Additionally, this Note argues the D.C. Circuit was correct to
hold the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and
bear arms and to strike down the District of Columbia's gun control ordi-
nances. 21 Part II of this Note summarizes the conflicting views of the Sec-
ond Amendment's scope. 22 Part III examines the federal courts'
inconsistent applications of Miller.23 Next, Part IV traces the D.C. Circuit's
reasoning for its determination in Parker-that the District's gun control
ordinances violated the Second Amendment. 24 Part V provides an expla-
nation as to why the D.C. Circuit correctly held the Second Amendment
protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms.25 Finally, Part VI
discusses the likely impact of Parker by placing the issue in the context of
national application. 26
II. RIFLING THROUGH THE PAST: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECOND
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Unloading the Second Amendment's Conflicting Interpretations
The legal right of the people to keep and bear arms is a right that
existed before the Constitution.27 Early Americans understood the right
as permitting private uses of guns, including hunting, defending against
attacks by individuals and resisting a tyrannical government, in addition to
any militia service the state required of an individual.28 At the time the
20. For a discussion of the development of Second Amendment juispru-
dence, see infra notes 51-110 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the Parker facts, see infra notes 75-83 and accompany-
ing text.
22. For a discussion of the Second Amendment's history and the two promi-
nent interpretations of the Second Amendment, see infra notes 27-43 and accom-
panying text.
23. For a discussion of cases interpreting the Second Amendment since 1939,
see infra notes 51-110 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Parker, see infra notes 87-
116 and accompanying text.
25. For a critique of the opinions rendered in Parker, see infra notes 118-32
and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of Parke~s potential effect on future Second Amendment
claims, see infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
27. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 281-83 (Little, Brown & Co. 1981) (1880) (ex-
plaining Second Amendment preserved right to keep and bear arms established in
English common law); see also ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 98 (discuss-
ing English citizens were required to possess arms because England depended
upon citizen's militia, not army, to defend country). For a discussion of the right
to keep and bear arms before the Constitution, see Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra
note 4, at 49-60.
28. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (dis-
cussing right to keep and bear arms in early America), cert. granted in part sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); United States v.
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Second Amendment was drafted, the term "militia" referred generally to
all adult male citizens, and rarely referred to standing military organiza-
tions. 29 The second Militia Act of 1792 defined the militia as all "able-
bodied" male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (observing eighteenth century newspa-
pers and letters showed early Americans believed Second Amendment guaranteed
individual's right to keep and bear arms); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 900-03 (Found. Press 2000) (1978) (recognizing Second Amend-
ment right allows individuals to possess and use firearms in defense of themselves
and their homes); Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 30 (observing Second
Amendment was intended to prevent federal government from using military
power to tyrannize people); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty,
and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REv. 103, 130 (1987) [hereinafter Lund,
Political Liberty] (asserting Second Amendment protects individual's right for self-
defense); Scott Bursor, Note, Toward a Functional Framework for Interpreting the Sec-
ond Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1125, 1131 (1996) (discussing Second Amendment
protected private ownership of arms for several reasons, one being that ownership
of arms for self-defense was perceived as natural right of individual); Docal, supra
note 6, at 1106 (explaining early Americans had individual right to bear arms for
self-preservation, hunting and resisting government violence). The private right of
self-defense was necessary because, until the nineteenth century, most Americans
did not have the protection of a professional police force. See Parker, 478 F.3d at
383 n.9 (noting importance of self-defense at this time in America), cert. granted in
part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.). But see
Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How. LJ.
589, 589-92 (1991) (arguing debate over use of handguns for hunting misinter-
prets Second Amendment's intended goals); Spitzer, supra note 8, at 6 ("The Sec-
ond Amendment provides no protection for personal weapons uses, including
hunting, sporting, collecting, or even personal self-protection"); Brady Center to
Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 19, at 5 (arguing common law right of self-de-
fense has no relationship with Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms).
See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 353 (explaining Second and Third Amend-
ments addressed concerns of revolutionary period when state militias defeated
British); Gallia, supra note 4, at 146-47 (discussing English Bill of Rights of 1689
provision guaranteeing right to possess arms that enabled English citizens to help
law enforcement, provide for common defense, resist tyrannical government and
engage in self-defense). The right to keep and bear arms was a part of some state
constitutions before the ratification of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., O'BREN, supra
note 3, at 353 (describing Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1776 that provided "the
people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state"); Op.
Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 19 (noting many early state constitutions pro-
tected individual's right to keep and bear arms for defense of self and state).
29. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (asserting militia com-
prised all males capable of acting together for common defense); Emerson, 270
F.3d at 226 (explaining eighteenth century militia referred to male civilians);
Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 22 (noting original Constitution differenti-
ated militia from "armies," "land forces" or "troops"). Contra Bogus, supra note 11,
at 487 (arguing Founders did not believe in universal militia and after Revolution-
ary War some Founders believed select militia would be more useful). See generally
Chuck Dougherty, Note, The Minutemen, the National Guard and the Private Militia
Movement: Will the Real Militia Please Stand Up?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 959, 968
(1995) (noting federal government did not provide funding for state militias and
states gradually allowed their militias to deteriorate).
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old.3 ° The militia was intended to resist foreign aggression, serve as an
internal police force for the states and deter the use of a federal standing
army against the states.3 1 From this point, and after significant scholarly
debate, two prominent interpretational theories emerged.
3 2
30. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 387 (observing Act defined militia as: "each and
every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein,
who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five
years" (quoting second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271)), cert. granted in part
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); accord Miller,
307 U.S. at 179 (describing militia as "civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion");
Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining militia system in
American colonies was based upon England's system and required all adult male
citizens to possess arms for common defense). The second Militia Act of 1792 was
passed on May 8,1792, by members of the Second Congress. See Parker, 478 F.3d at
387 (observing Second Congress knew intended meaning of "militia" in Second
Amendment because many members of Second Congress drafted Bill of Rights),
cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007)
(mem.). But see Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 341 (1990) (observing
second Militia Act of 1792's requirement that members of militia arm themselves
was "virtually ignored" and militia never became reliable fighting force); Hickman,
81 F.3d at 102 n.8 (noting requirement that all men be armed was ignored in
practice and led to establishment of modern National Guard system).
31. See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 340 (1990) (discussing compromise of individual
liberty, state sovereignty and necessity of common defense resulted in constitu-
tional provisions for national army and state militia); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at
327 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co., 1937) (explaining standing army
could not yield to "a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms
in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their
common liberties"); STORY, supra note 2, at 708-09 (explaining militia was "natural
defence of a free country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections,
and domestic usurpations of power by rulers"); ChristopherJ. Schmidt, An Interna-
tional Human Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 996
(2007) (finding possession of arms by individuals was necessary for self-defense in
colonial America because professional police force did not exist); David Yassky,
The Second Amendment: Structure, History and Constitutional Change, 99 MIcH. L. REv.
588, 597 (2000) (determining Founders' primary concern was to ensure new na-
tion's military force was composed of state militias instead of federal standing
army); Docal, supra note 6, at 1108 (discussing Framers believed armed citizenry
would protect against internal abuses of power); Dougherty, supra note 29, at 964
(explaining after Revolutionary War, United States relied upon state militias for
national defense). See generally Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (asserting Second Amend-
ment's purpose was to guarantee militia's continued existence and effectiveness).
Though the modern militia system differs from the eighteenth century system, the
militia's purpose remains the same: to enforce the laws of the country and to op-
pose invasions. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15 (asserting function of militia is to
.execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions").
32. See, e.g., Emerson, 270 F.3d at 218 (noting courts and scholars have pro-
posed different interpretations of Second Amendment in recent decades); Silveira
v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing increasing concerns
about gun violence, passage of legislation restricting sale and use of firearms and
cultural significance of firearms in America have intensified debate over Second
Amendment's scope).
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1. The "Individual Right" Theory
Under the "individual right" theory of the Second Amendment, the
Second Amendment recognizes the right of all individuals to keep and
bear arms, regardless of whether an individual is a member of a militia or
engaged in military service. 33 Individual right theorists believe the Second
Amendment's use of "militia" broadly includes all citizens. 34 In addition,
the phrase "bear Arms" refers to any carrying of a weapon, by a soldier or a
civilian. 3 5 By preserving the people's right to keep and bear arms, the
Second Amendment prohibits the federal government from disarming in-
dividuals, the people from which the militia is drawn. 36 Thus, an individ-
ual has standing to bring a claim for a violation of the Second
Amendment. 3
7
2. The "Collective Right" Theory
Conversely, under the "collective right" theory, the Second Amend-
ment does not apply to individuals.3 8 Rather, the Second Amendment
protects the right of the state governments to maintain their militias and
33. See Schmidt, supra note 31, at 985 (arguing Second Amendment's text,
while potentially ambiguous to modern reader, established individual's right to
keep and bear arms); Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 1 (describing indi-
vidual right view of Second Amendment). Advocates of the individual right view
explain the First, Second and Fourth Amendments were framed together. See
Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 20 (asserting Second Amendment's lan-
guage is "no more ambiguous or unclear than other provisions of the Bill of
Rights").
34. See Gallia, supra note 4, at 139 (asserting, under individual right theory,
"militia" includes all citizens regardless of whether individual is member of
military).
35. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 229-30 (determining Second Amendment's use of
"bear Arms" is not restricted to bearing arms in military service).
36. See Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 25 ("The Second Amendment
simply forbids one form of inappropriate regulation: disarming the people from
whom the militia must necessarily be drawn.").
37. See Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 1 (describing individual right
view of Second Amendment).
38. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (dis-
cussing collective right view), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 218 (explaining, under
collective right view, Second Amendment does not apply to individuals, but pro-
tects right of state to arm its militia); ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 97-98
(observing, under collective right view, common law right to keep and bear arms
was not individual right to keep weapons, but existed for defense of state and com-
munity); Bogus, supra note 11, at 492 (arguing Second Amendment protects right
of states to arm militia); Lieber, supra note 7, at 1084 (emphasizing Framers viewed
Second Amendment as protection against federal intrusion into states' power over
governance of their militias, not as individual's right); Warren E. Burger, The Right
to Bear Arms, PARADE MA.,Jan. 14, 1990, at 4 ("[T]he very language of the Second
Amendment refutes any argument that it was intended to guarantee every citizen
an unfettered right to any kind of weapon he or she desires.").
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prevents the federal government from usurping this power.39 Under this
view of the Second Amendment, the federal government and state govern-
ments can restrict and prohibit the possession and use of firearms subject
only to constitutional constraints (e.g., due process and equal protection
violations) .40 Furthermore, under the collective right theory, the federal
government may disarm individuals when it no longer needs a militia. 4 1
In addition, collective right theorists believe the common law right to keep
and bear arms existed for the defense of the state-not for an individual's
private use.42 Thus, according to collective right theorists, individuals lack
the standing constitutionally required to bring claims under the Second
Amendment.
4 3
39. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (noting Second Amend-
ment limits only power of Congress and not power of states); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (asserting Second Amendment's right shall
not be infringed by Congress); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir.
1992) ("The purpose of the Second Amendment is to restrain the federal govern-
ment from regulating the possession of arms where such regulation would inter-
fere with the preservation or efficiency of the militia."); 79 AM. JUR. 2D Weapons and
Firearms § 5 (2007) ("The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, in declaring that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed, means no more than that this right shall not be infringed by Congress
.... "); 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 5 (2007) (explaining it is well-established Second
Amendment limits power of federal government); Denning, supra note 3, at 996
(explaining, under collective right view, Second Amendment was intended to pre-
vent federal government from interfering with state militias); Keith A. Ehrman &
Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen
Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 5, 32 (1989) (asserting Framers would
not have included militia clause if they intended to guarantee individual's right to
keep and bear arms). But cf. Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Gould, J., specially concurring) ("Restricting the Second Amendment to 'collec-
tive rights' of militias and ignoring individual rights of the people betray [sic] a key
protection against the recurrent tyranny that may in each generation threaten in-
dividual liberty.").
40. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting, under
collective right theory, Second Amendment guarantees right of people to maintain
effective state militia, and not individual's right to possess arms).
41. See Nordyke, 319 F.3d at 1197 (Gould, J., specially concurring) (exploring
implications of Second Amendment if Framers intended Second Amendment to
protect right of states to maintain militia).
42. See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 98 (explaining collective right
theorists argue restrictions on individual's ownership of guns proves validity of gun
control laws); Dougherty, supra note 29, at 971 (explaining, under collective right
view, Second Amendment's use of "militia" refers to National Guard, not
individuals).
43. See, e.g., Parker, 478 F.3d at 379 (setting forth District's argument that indi-
viduals do not have standing to bring claims under Second Amendment because
"militia," as intended by Framers, no longer exists today and militia's modern ana-
logue, National Guard, is equipped by federal government), cert. granted in part sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); Stevens v.
United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) ("[T]here can be no serious claim
to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm.").
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B. The Demise of the Papular Militia
The federal government changed the eighteenth century militia's
structure to render the militia a viable military force in modern warfare. 44
In 1903, Congress passed the Dick Act, which divided the militia into the
organized militia, known as the National Guard, and the unorganized mili-
tia.45 In 1916, Congress declared that the Army of the United States in-
cluded the National Guard.46 Furthermore, since 1933, anyone who has
enlisted in a state National Guard organization has concurrently enlisted
in the National Guard of the United States. 47 In 1956, Congress passed
the modern Militia Act, which defined the militia as all male citizens who
are between the ages of seventeen and forty-five years old, and all female
citizens who are members of the National Guard. 48 When addressing Sec-
44. See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 29, at 976 (finding today's militia has little
in common with militia Framers knew).
45. See Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903) (dividing militia into organized
militia, known as National Guard of State, Territory or District of Columbia and
Reserve Militia). The Act provided, in part:
That the militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen of the re-
spective States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and every able-
bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a
citizen, who is more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age
Id. (defining militia); Dougherty, supra note 29, at 969 (noting Dick Act started
federalization of militia). Congress has the power to provide for the organization,
equipment and government of the militia pursuant to its Article I powers. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (giving Congress power to "provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be em-
ployed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia").
46. See National Defense Act, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916) (providing Army of
United States includes National Guard), amended by National Guard Act of 1933,
ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153. The Act provided, in part:
That the Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the
Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps,
the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and such
other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law.
Id. (declaring Army of United States consists of National Guard).
47. See Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990) (citing National
Guard Act of 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153, 160-61) (providing when individual enlists
in state National Guard organization, individual becomes part of Enlisted Reserve
Corps of Army and retains status as member of state National Guard unit until
ordered to active duty in Army).
48. See 10 U.S.C. § 311 (a) (2000) (defining modern militia). The statute
provides:
The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least
17 years of age and... under 45 years of age who are, or who have made
a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of
female citizens of the United States who are members of the National
Guard.
Id. (defining militia of United States). Additionally, the Act declared the organ-
ized militia consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia, and the unorgan-
ized militia consists of every member of the militia who is not a member of the
National Guard or the Naval Militia. See id. § 311 (b) (stating two classes of militia
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ond Amendment claims, however, many federal court decisions have lim-
ited the militia to include only the National Guard, and not the members
of state militias.4
9
III. SORTING THROUGH "HISTORICAL RESIDUE": 5 0 FEDERAL COURTS
STRUGGLE TO APPLY MILLER
Despite the First Circuit's characterization of Miller as "outdated" a
mere three years after the case, both sides of the Second Amendment de-
bate rely on Miller for support. 5 1 In Miller, the defendants were indicted
are organized militia and unorganized militia). The National Guard is a part of
the national defense system, and can serve states' needs as well. See, e.g., 53 Am.
JUR. 2D Military and Civil Defense § 25 (2007) (explaining while National Guard is
under state control within each state, activity and function of National Guard are
primarily provided for by federal law). It is worth noting states may maintain an
additional defense force to supplement the state's National Guard-this force is
exempt from being drafted into the Armed Forces of the United States. See 32
U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000) ("In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State ... may
... organize and maintain defense forces. A defense force established under this
section . . . may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.").
49. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding individual's membership in Georgia's unorganized militia did not render
individual's possession of machine guns and pipe bombs related to preservation of
well regulated militia), vacated in part on reh'g, 133 F.3d 1412 (1998); United States
v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding individual's membership in
unorganized militia did not cause individual's possession of machine gun to be
connected with militia activity such that Second Amendment applied); United
States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting "technical" member-
ship in state militia or membership in non-governmental military organization
does not satisfy Second Amendment's reasonable relationship test); United States
v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (rejecting argument that because
individual was member of Kansas militia individual's possession of machine gun
preserved effectiveness of militia such that Second Amendment applied); United
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 105 (6th Cir. 1976) (determining membership in
"sedentary militia" does not satisfy reasonable relationship test). According to one
commentator, although the militia has changed significantly since the eighteenth
century, the modern definition of militia may not be as limited as federal court
decisions have found. See Dougherty, supra note 29, at 974-77, 985 (asserting Na-
tional Guard, law enforcement agencies and state unorganized militias fulfill eight-
eenth century militia's purposes in modern society).
50. See Hale, 978 F.2d at 1019 (describing militia's history and discussing
Miller's finding that Second Amendment protects possession of weapon that bears
reasonable relationship to preservation of militia).
51. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) ("[T]he rule
of the Miller case, if intended to be comprehensive and complete would seem to be
already outdated."); see also Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 392 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (noting Miller is "decision that both sides of the current gun control
debate have claimed as their own"), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); Denning, supra note 3, at 963-65 (argu-
ing federal courts have "strayed so far from" Milles holding "to the point of being
intellectually dishonest"). See generally Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("Despite the increased attention by commentators and political inter-
est groups to the question of what exactly the Second Amendment protects, with
the sole exception of the Fifth Circuit's Emerson decision there exists no thorough
judicial examination of the amendment's meaning.").
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for transporting a short-barreled shotgun from one state to another in
violation of the National Firearms Act.52 The Supreme Court rejected the
defendants' argument that the Act violated their Second Amendment
rights, reasoning there was no evidence demonstrating the possession or
use of a short-barreled shotgun had "some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."53 In addition, the
Second Amendment did not protect the possession of the weapon because
short-barreled shotguns were associated with criminal activity, and thus
did not contribute to the common defense. 54 As a result, the Second
Amendment did not guarantee the right to keep and bear such a
weapon.
55
Since Miller, federal courts have applied different standards to Second
Amendment claims-the standards range from focusing on an individual's
state of mind to finding that individuals lack standing to bring a Second
52. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939) (explaining National
Firearms Act prohibited interstate transportation of certain firearms without regis-
tration or stamped order). The National Firearms Act of 1934 was the first federal
statute to regulate the possession and use of firearms. See Daniel E. Feld, Annota-
tion, Federal Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, 37 A.L.R. FED. 696, §6 (1978) (discuss-
ing Second Amendment challenges to federal statutes that regulate firearms). The
district court held that the Act violated the defendants' Second Amendment rights
and quashed the indictment. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 177 (stating district court sus-
tained defendants' demurrer that challenged their indictment based on their Sec-
ond Amendment rights). On direct appeal by the Government, the Supreme
Court reversed the district court's judgment. See id. at 178 (finding Second
Amendment did not protect defendants' possession of short-barreled shotgun).
53. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (determining use or possession of short-barreled
shotgun did not have reasonable relationship to preservation of well regulated mi-
litia). The Supreme Court stated:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
"shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this
time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guaran-
tees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
Id. (emphasis added) (rejecting defendants' Second Amendment claims).
54. See id. (commenting it was not within judicial notice that short-barreled
shotgun was "ordinary military equipment" or could contribute to common de-
fense); see also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 222 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting
National Firearms Act restricted interstate transportation only of weapons used by
criminals and gang members); Brief for State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Appellants at 30, Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103
(D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-7041) (observing short-barreled shotgun would not contrib-
ute to common defense because short-barreled shotguns were commonly used by
gang members).
55. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (finding Second Amendment provides no right
to keep and bear short-barreled shotgun).
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Amendment claim. 56 In Cases v. United States,57 the First Circuit, reviewing
the Second Amendment as it was applied, found the Federal Firearms Act
did not violate the Second Amendment because the individual's posses-
sion and use of a revolver was without "any thought or intention of con-
tributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia."58 Furthermore,
the First Circuit determined the individual was not a member of a military
organization and the use of the revolver was not in preparation for a mili-
tary career.59 The First Circuitjustified its additional requirement that the
individual must possess the firearm with the intent of contributing to the
militia by concluding that Miller did not create a standard governing Sec-
ond Amendment claims.60
In Hickman v. Block,61 the Ninth Circuit rejected an individual's claim
that a weapons permit issuance policy violated the individual's Second
Amendment right.6 2 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the individual
lacked standing to sue for a violation of the Second Amendment because
only states can show legal injury when the Second Amendment right is
infringed. 63 According to the Attorney General, however, the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller to address the defendants' Second Amendment
56. Compare United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 105-06 (6th Cir. 1976) (re-
jecting individual's Second Amendment challenge, even though individual was
member of militia and possessed firearm that bore reasonable relationship to pres-
ervation of militia, because Second Amendment only applies to State's right to
maintain militia), and Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971)
(holding provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 did not
violate individual's Second Amendment right because "there can be no serious
claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm"),
with Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Even in states which
profess to maintain a citizen militia, an individual may not rely on this fact to
manipulate the Constitution's legal injury requirement by arguing that.., he him-
self is a member of the armed citizenry from which the state draws its militia."),
and United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942) (emphasizing there was
no absolute constitutional right to possess weapons at common law and federal
statute that reasonably classified who could possess weapons did not violate Second
Amendment), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See generally Denning,
supra note 3, at 965 (asserting Miller is even more misunderstood and misinter-
preted than Second Amendment).
57. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
58. See id. at 923 (rejecting individual's claim that Federal Firearms Act vio-
lated individual's Second Amendment right because individual possessed firearm
without any intention of contributing to well regulated militia).
59. See id. (stating court's rationale).
60. See id. at 922-23 (noting Miller did not create general rule applicable to all
cases).
61. 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
62. See id. at 102-03 (finding individual did not have standing to sue for viola-
tion of Second Amendment).
63. See id. at 101 (concluding only states can show legal injury when Second
Amendment right is infringed because Second Amendment guarantees right of
states to maintain armed militia).
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claim is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's view that only states can bring
a Second Amendment claim.
6 4
Modern courts addressing Second Amendment claims confront the
challenge of reconciling Miller's declaration that the Second Amendment
does not apply to members of the military and the fact that the modern
militia is a part of the military. 65 In United States v. Hale,66 the Eighth
Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs Second Amendment challenge to a federal
law that prohibited possession of unregistered machine guns because the
plaintiff was not a member of the military or in preparation for a military
career.67 The Eighth Circuit's examination of the individual's participa-
tion in the military may have been unwarranted by Miller, which differenti-
ated between the militia and the military.6
8
To further confound Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Fifth
Circuit declared its holding in Emerson-that the Second Amendment pro-
tects the right of individuals to privately keep and bear arms-was consis-
tent with Miller.69 In Emerson, an individual was indicted for carrying a
pistol in violation of a federal law that prohibited the possession of a fire-
64. See Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 5 (observing Supreme Court's
decision in Miller to address individual's Second Amendment claim instead of re-
jecting individual's claim for lack of standing is inconsistent with collective right
view).
65. See Dougherty, supra note 29, at 970 (noting Constitution's use of "militia"
is complex because eighteenth century militia no longer exists). See generally Na-
tional Defense Act, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916) (declaring Army of United States
consists of National Guard while serving country); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 178-79 (1939) ("The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and
train is set in contrast with Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the
consent of Congress."); Todd Barnet, Gun Control Laws Violate the Second Amendment
and May Lead to Higher Crime Rates, 63 Mo. L. REv. 155, 168 (1998) ("It is clear that
the current National Guard, which does not embrace all eligible citizens, is not the
'well regulated militia' within the meaning of the Second Amendment.").
66. 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992).
67. See id. at 1020 (quoting Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir.
1942)) ("[W]here such a claimant presented no evidence either that he was a
member of a military organization or that his use of the weapon was 'in prepara-
tion for a military career,' the Second Amendment did not protect the possession
of the weapon.").
68. See Denning, supra note 3, at 992-93 (criticizing Eighth Circuit for "condi-
tioning Second Amendment rights upon a showing of membership in or prepara-
tion for membership in a military organization"). One commentator asserted: "If
'militia,' as used in the Second Amendment, meant anything to the Framers, it was
intended to be the opposite of 'army."' See id. (arguing "militia" was not synony-
mous with "army"). But cf Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Mangling Miller:
How the Parker Opinion Distorted and Defied Supreme Court Precedent 1, 13 (2007),
http://www.gunlawsuits.org/defend/second/fantasy/pdf/parker-opinion-critique
1.pdf (arguing Miller declared well regulated militia of Second Amendment was
organized military force).
69. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) ("We hold,
consistent with Miller, that [the Second Amendment] protects the right of individ-
uals, including those not then actually a member of any militia or engaged in ac-
tive military service or training, to privately possess and bear their own firearms.").
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arm by an individual who was subject to a domestic violence restraining
order.7 After exploring the Second Amendment's history, the Fifth Cir-
cuit determined the Second Amendment applies to all individuals, includ-
ing those who are not members of a militia nor engaged in military service
or training.7' The court declared the rejection of the individual right view
by the other circuits was based on an "erroneous assumption" that Miller
settled the issue. 72 Nonetheless, in Emerson, the Fifth Circuit held the indi-
vidual's Second Amendment right was not violated because an individual's
right to keep and bear arms is subject to limited, "narrowly tailored" re-
strictions that are consistent with the Second Amendment's historical un-
derstanding. 73 Accordingly, prohibiting the possession of a pistol by an
individual who was subject to a domestic violence restraining order was a
reasonable restriction of the individual's Second Amendment right.7 4
IV. PARKER: AJUDIcIAL HIT OR MISFIRE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT?
A. Facts and Procedure: The Residents "Fixed Their Sights" on Possessing
Handguns for Self-Defense
Ever since the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in
Emerson, individual right theorists have been waiting for another court to
adopt their view; and there was Parker.75 Six residents of the District of
Columbia (the "District") challenged several of the District's gun control
ordinances, claiming the ordinances violated their individual rights to
70. See id. at 211-12 (stating district court granted individual's motion to dis-
miss on grounds that federal law violated Second Amendment).
71. See id. at 260 (declaring Second Amendment's history confirmed text pro-
tects individual's right to keep and bear arms and provided no evidence Second
Amendment limited federal government's power to maintain standing army).
72. See id. at 227 (asserting other circuits incorrectly interpreted Miller as re-
jecting individual right view).
73. See id. at 261-62 (acknowledging felons, infants and individuals of "un-
sound mind" have been prohibited from possessing firearms throughout history,
and prosecuting individual for possession of firearm while subject to domestic vio-
lence restraining order does not violate Second Amendment).
74. See id. at 261 (stating individual's Second Amendment right is subject to
restrictions). Reasonable restrictions of the Second Amendment by the govern-
ment may be appropriate under several different theories. See, e.g., Nordyke v.
King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1197 n.l (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould,J., specially concurring)
(commenting not all weapons are necessarily "Arms" within Second Amendment's
meaning and important government interests may outweigh individual's Second
Amendment right); Janice Baker, Comment, The Next Step in Second Amendment
Analysis: Incorporating the Right to Bear Arms into the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 35, 55 (2002) (noting strict scrutiny follows if Supreme Court adopts
view that Second Amendment is fundamental to American scheme of justice);
Lieber, supra note 7, at 1084 (proposing if Second Amendment guarantees individ-
ual's right, firearms regulations enacted by states should be subject to strict
scrutiny).
75. See, e.g., Emerson, 270 F.3d at 260 (holding Second Amendment protects
individual's right to keep and bear arms); Lieber, supra note 7, at 1080-81 (noting
individual right view has "catapulted" recently to forefront of debate and Emerson
was "much anticipated decision" for individual right theorists).
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2008] NOTE
keep and bear arms-rights, the individuals argued, that are guaranteed
by the Second Amendment. 76 The ordinances challenged by the residents
(1) barred the registration of handguns that were not registered before
1976; (2) prohibited carrying a pistol, inside or outside the home, without
a license; and (3) required that all lawfully owned firearms be kept un-
loaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or a similar appara-
tus.77 The residents, none of whom were members of the District's militia,
argued the drafters intended the Second Amendment to embody an indi-
vidual's right protecting the private use of firearms. 78 On the other hand,
the District argued the Second Amendment's purpose was to protect the
state militias from intrusion by the federal government.79 In addition, the
District contended the Second Amendment's meaning of "militia" refers
only to the militias organized when the Constitution was drafted, which,
conveniently for the District, no longer exist.
80
76. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ex-
plaining four residents wanted to keep handguns in their homes for self-defense
and one owned registered shotgun that resident wanted to keep assembled), cert.
granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007)
(mem.). Another resident was authorized to carry a handgun while on duty as a
District of Columbia (the "District") special police officer, and wanted to keep a
handgun at his home. See id. at 373-74 (stating District denied officer's application
for registration certificate to own handgun).
77. See id. at 376 (describing District's gun control ordinances challenged by
residents). While one of the District's ordinances barred the registration of hand-
guns, the District did not entirely prohibit handgun registration. See D.C. CODE
§ 7-2502.02(a) (4) (1976) (allowing certificates for pistols registered before 1976
and excluding retired police officers of Metropolitan Police Department from ban
on pistol registration). Additionally, the residents challenged one of the District's
ordinances to the extent that it prevented a registered gun owner from moving a
gun from one room to another within a gun owner's home. See D.C. CODE § 22-
4504 (1976) (requiring resident to apply for additional license from Chief of Po-
lice who had discretion to deny application in order for resident to lawfully carry
pistol, inside or outside home). The third provision the residents challenged re-
quired firearms be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock. See
D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (1976) (stating lawfully owned firearms be kept unloaded
and disassembled or bound by trigger lock or similar apparatus).
78. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 381 (arguing "the right of the people" protects indi-
vidual's right and "keep and bear arms" implies private use and ownership), cert.
granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007)
(mem.). The residents claimed they had a right to keep firearms that were accessi-
ble and could be used for self-defense in a home. See id. at 374 (stating facts of
case).
79. See id. at 378 (setting forth District's argument that people's right to bear
arms refers only to military affairs and individual could invoke Second Amend-
ment's protection only if gun control legislation impaired individual's right to
serve in militia).
80. See id. (arguing ordinance banning all firearms would be constitutional
because militia contemplated by Second Amendment no longer exists); accord
Spitzer, supra note 8, at 26 ("Americans are no longer obliged to keep firearms for
militia service, given that such service no longer occurs.").
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The district court held the Second Amendment protects an individ-
ual's right to keep and bear arms for service in the militia only.8 ' There-
fore, the plaintiffs could not assert a claim under the Second Amendment
because they were not members of the District's militia.8 2 The residents
appealed the district court's judgment and the D.C. Circuit reversed the
decision, holding the "Second Amendment protects an individual['s]
right to keep and bear arms."8 3 The D.C. Circuit concluded that the Dis-
trict's ban on pistols that were not registered before 1976 violated the Sec-
ond Amendment by unreasonably restricting the possession of
handguns.8 4 In addition, the ordinance that prevented a handgun from
moving inside one's home violated the Second Amendment because it
frustrated the Second Amendment's purpose of self-defense.8 5 Finally,
the District's requirement that a registered firearm be kept unloaded and
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock unreasonably restricted the Sec-
ond Amendment's right because the requirement also prohibited the law-
ful use of handguns for self-defense.
8 6
81. SeeParker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004)
(determining there is no individual right to bear arms outside service in militia),
rev'd, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.). The district court reasoned the plain-
tiffs had no viable Second Amendment claims because they were not members of
the District's militia. See id. at 109 (granting District's motion to dismiss).
82. See id. at 109 (stating court's holding that Second Amendment protects
individual's right to keep and bear arms for service in militia only).
83. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 395 (stating court's holding that Second Amend-
ment protects individual's fight), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.).
84. See id. at 400-01 (determining pistols are "arms" within Second Amend-
ment's meaning). But see id. at 407 n.13 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (arguing Sec-
ond Amendment does not apply to firearm laws enacted by states because
Supreme Court has never held Amendment has been incorporated). Further-
more, the dissent argued it would not make sense to incorporate the Second
Amendment to the states because the Second Amendment was intended to protect
the states against a potentially oppressive federal government. See id. (noting
Amendment's only purpose was to prevent federal government from infringing
Second Amendment's right).
85. See id. at 400 (majority opinion) (holding District's restriction on carrying
pistol violated Second Amendment); accord Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261,
271-72 (7th Cir. 1982) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (arguing Village's prohibition
against handgun possession within home prevented individual from protecting in-
dividual's home and family, endangered law-abiding citizens and undermined
maxim that home is one's castle).
86. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 401 (reversing district court's judgment and hold-
ing ordinances unreasonably restricted Second Amendment's right), cert. granted in
part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.). Before
examining the Second Amendment's text, however, the D.C. Circuit addressed
whether the residents had standing to challenge the District's gun control ordi-
nances. See id. at 374-76 (recognizing residents must have suffered injury-in-fact to
have constitutional standing to challenge District's ordinances). The court con-
cluded one resident had standing because the resident had applied for a registra-
tion certificate to own a handgun and had been denied. See id. at 376 (finding
resident's injury was denial of registration certificate).
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B. The D.C. Circuit's Groundbreaking Resolution of the Second
Amendment Claim
1. Text of the Constitution
In reviewing the Second Amendment claim, the D.C. Circuit first ana-
lyzed the Second Amendment's text: "A well regulated Militia, being nec-
essary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms shall not be infringed."8 7 The court rejected the District's argu-
ment that "the people" referred to the states because the Framers differen-
tiated between "the states" and "the people" in the Tenth Amendment.88
In addition, the court observed that "the people" is found in the First,
Second, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and that the Supreme
Court concluded the Second Amendment's use of "the people," consistent
with these amendments, also protects an individual's right.89 Thus, the
D.C. Circuit determined the'Second Amendment guarantees a right that
belongs to an individual.90
The court then rejected the District's assertion that the phrase "keep
and bear Arms" was purely military language, and found the phrase to
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (granting people right to keep and bear arms);
Parker, 478 F.3d at 380-81 (commenting no precedent existed in Supreme Court or
D.C. Circuit), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
645 (2007) (mem.). While courts typically examine a constitutional provision's
drafting history when interpreting the text, the D.C. Circuit noted the Second
Amendment's history was minimal and unhelpful. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 390-91
(noting debates in First Congress imply Second Amendment's individual guaran-
tee was settled because debates did not refer to Second Amendment's second
clause), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645(2007) (mem.).
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."); Parker, 478 F.3d at 382 (rejecting District's
argument that "the people" referred to states, organized militia or people engaged
in militia service), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); accord Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 12 (noting
Second Amendment protects individual's right because Constitution does not con-
fer rights on state or federal governmental entities, only on individuals).
89. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 381-82 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)) (discussing Bill of Rights provisions that use phrase "the
people," including Second Amendment, and protect individual's right), cert.
granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007)
(mem.). The Supreme Court interpreted "the people" in the First, Second,
Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments as referring to "a class of persons who are
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connec-
tion with this country to be considered part of that community". See Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (defining "the people").
90. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 382 (explaining natural reading of Second Amend-
ment's language was consistent with usage of "the people" in Bill of Rights), cert.
granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007)
(mem.); accord United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2001)
(finding "the people" has same meaning in Second Amendment as elsewhere in
Constitution).
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mean carrying arms for private purposes, including self-defense. 9 ' The
District referenced the "conscientious objector clause" included in the
Second Amendment's initial draft to demonstrate that "keep and bear
Arms" was purely military language. 9 2 While the phrase "bear arms" some-
times referred to the use of weapons in connection with military service in
the late eighteenth century, the D.C. Circuit determined that other uses of
the phrase implying a private use illustrated the Framers did not equate
"bear Arms" exclusively with military service.93 Additionally, the court
found "keep" to mean "ownership or possession of a functioning weapon
by an individual for private use." 94 The District proposed, alternatively,
91. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 384-85 (explaining any doubt whether "bear Arms"
has military meaning is resolved by phrases "the people" and "keep," which have
individual and private meanings), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.).
92. See id. at 384 (explaining conscientious objector clause excused individu-
als who were "religiously scrupulous of bearing arms" from military service, and
was intended to benefit "Quakers, Mennonites and other pacifist sects" who were
ethically opposed to soldiering). According to the District, the clause equated
"bearing arms" with military service, and "bearing arms" would not have been used
if the phrase meant "carrying arms." See id. (asserting Quakers were not religiously
scrupulous of carrying arms in general, but were opposed to carrying arms for
military purposes).
93. See id. (concluding reading phrase exclusively as military language was
mistake, based upon survey of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century state
constitutional provisions that illustrated phrase was used in context of self-de-
fense). The D.C. Circuit found the word "bear" in the Second Amendment was a
synonym for "carry." See id. (relying upon Oxford English Dictionary, original
Webster's dictionary and Dr. Johnson's Dictionary, often used by Supreme Court
to decipher founding-era meaning of terms); accord Emerson, 270 F.3d at 231 (find-
ing "bear arms" refers generally to carrying or wearing arms); Op. Off. Legal
Counsel, supra note 4, at 10-11 (explaining "keep arms" referred to private owner-
ship of arms "by individuals as individuals," not keeping of arms by government or
its soldiers). But see Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (assert-
ing exemption from bearing arms for religiously scrupulous was exemption from
carrying arms in service of state militia, not from private possession of arms); Brady
Center to Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 19, at 7 (criticizing D.C. Circuit's con-
clusion that "bear Arms" has non-military meaning). See generally Cottrol & Dia-
mond, supra note 12, at 1004 ("There is considerable evidence that the armed
population and the militia were intended to serve more than a simply military
function."). Additionally, the dissenting delegates at the Pennsylvania ratification
convention used the phrase "bear arms" to encompass uses of weapons outside a
military setting. See THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE
CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS, reprinted in 3 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145, 151 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981) (" [T] hat the people
have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state, or the
United States, or for the purpose of killing game."). But see Lieber, supra note 7, at
1111 (noting minority's interpretation of Second Amendment was different than
version actually approved by Congress, implying Framers intended to provide lim-
ited protection for militia only).
94. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 385-86 (defining "keep" as "to retain" or "to have in
custody," and rejecting District's argument that "keep" was synonymous with "keep
up," phrase used in expressions such as "keep up a well regulated and disciplined
militia"), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645
(2007) (mem.); accord COOLEY, supra note 27, at 280-82 (asserting Second Amend-
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that even if the Second Amendment guarantees an individual's right, the
District is not prohibited from regulating the ownership of handguns, as
modern handguns are not within the Second Amendment's meaning of
"Arms."95 Rejecting this argument, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the sec-
ond Militia Act of 1792 stated expressly what arms the members of the
militia were required to keep, including pistols.9 6 These arms must have
been those weapons in common use at the time, and were precisely within
the Second Amendment's protection.97
The residents further contended the Second Amendment's reference
to the well regulated militia was synonymous with "the people" in the
Amendment's second clause. 98 In contrast, the District asserted the mili-
tia referred to a civilian fighting force, regulated and organized by state
law. 99 The court observed that the second Militia Act of 1792 required all
"able-bodied" male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five
years old to enroll in the militia through a local militia captain or of-
ficer.' 00 Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded the militia did not depend
upon organization by Congress because the militia existed before the mili-
tia was organized. 10 1
ment allowed individuals to lawfully use arms outside of militia service so individu-
als could efficiently use arms when needed for service). Contra Silveira, 312 F.3d at
1072 (finding "bear arms" referred to carrying of arms in military service only, and
did not include private use of arms for personal purposes).
95. See Parker, 478 F.3d. at 397 (rejecting District's argument that Second
Amendment does not prohibit District's regulation of handguns), cert. granted in
part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.).
96. See id. at 397-98 (citing second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, 271-
72) (requiring dragoon and officers to be armed with swords, hangers, bayonets
and pistols).
97. See id. at 398 (finding second Militia Act listed weapons that bore reasona-
ble relationship to preservation of "well regulated militia"). Furthermore, like the
First and Fourth Amendments, which protect modern communication devices, the
Second Amendment's protection is not limited to colonial-era firearms. See id. (de-
termining handgun is "descendant" of colonial-era weapon, and bears reasonable
relationship to preservation of militia, even though modern handgun is more ad-
vanced than its eighteenth century counterpart).
98. See id. at 386 (noting residents and District agreed second clause states
Second Amendment's purpose of ensuring continuance of militia).
99. See id. (arguing militia did not exist in absence of state organization).
100. See Second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, 271 (stating these
citizens "shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain or
commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall
reside").
101. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 387-88 (rejecting District's claim that existence of
militia required organization), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.). Additionally, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
District's argument that "well regulated" implied the militia consisted of a select
group of soldiers. See id. at 389 (emphasizing that, unlike participation in modem
National Guard, participation in eighteenth century militia was required and prev-
alent). In fact, the militia retained its popular quality even after it became "well
regulated." See id. (stating popular militia was consistent with individual's right to
keep and bear arms because preserving individual's right guaranteed militia would
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2. Intent of the Framers
The D.C. Circuit also found the Second Amendment's placement
within the Bill of Rights, which was primarily a declaration of rights be-
longing to individuals, supports the notion that the right to keep and bear
arms is an individual's right.10 2 Similarly, the Second Amendment's struc-
ture supports the individual right theory because the Federalists, who
made up the majority of the First Congress, wrote the Second Amend-
ment's preamble to alleviate the Anti-Federalists' concerns that the exis-
tence of the militia was in jeopardy and a strong federal government
would result in oppression. 10 3 Moreover, the Second Amendment is typi-
cal of eighteenth century state constitutional provisions that stated a prin-
ciple of government in a preface that was narrower than the language
used to achieve the principle. 10 4 In addition, the Second Amendment's
language explicitly protects the right of "the people," not the right of the
"militia," to keep and bear arms. 10 5
be ready to serve when necessary). But see Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1069
(9th Cir. 2002) (defining "militia" in Second Amendment as "state-created and -
organized military force").
102. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 383 (rejecting District's contention that First Con-
gress placed states' right among personal liberties), cert. granted in part sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); accord Op. Off. Legal
Counsel, supra note 4, at 11 (determining Second Amendment's placement in Bill
of Rights demonstrates right of people to keep and bear arms is individual's right);
cf Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 36 (explaining Second Amendment
could reasonably be interpreted as guaranteeing possession and use of arms for
protection of "houses" guarded by Third and Fourth Amendments).
103. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 389-90 (determining placement of Second Amend-
ment's civic purpose in preamble is in accord with ratification controversy, and
illustrates Framers' belief that individual had right to keep and bear arms), cert.
granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007)
(mem.). The Anti-Federalists wanted some guarantee that the popular militia
would continue to exist so standing armies would not be necessary. See id. at 390
(explaining many people at this time considered standing armies to be "the bane
of liberty"). Despite the fears of the Anti-Federalists, however, neither the Federal-
ists nor the Anti-Federalists believed the federal government had the authority to
disarm the people. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 259 (5th Cir. 2001)
(declaring Federalists recognized individual's right to keep and bear arms, and
frequently reminded Anti-Federalists individuals did not face danger of federal
standing army or federal control over militia because individuals were armed).
104. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 389-90 (finding Second Amendment's prefatory
language was narrower than individual's right to keep and bear arms), cert. granted
in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.).
105. See id. at 390 (reasoning Framers would have used different language if
Second Amendment's right was limited to protecting militias because this lan-
guage protected greater ownership and use of weapons than what was needed to
sustain militia); accord Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 26-27 (arguing that
interpreting "the people" to refer to militia is illogical because Framers would have
used same word if they intended to refer to same unit); Op. Off. Legal Counsel,
supra note 4, at 11-12 (observing "the people" is used in First Amendment and
Fourth Amendment and protects individual rights).
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3. Applying Miller
In the final phase of its analysis, the D.C. Circuit determined that
Miller supports the individual right theory. 10 6 In finding the Second
Amendment did not protect the ownership of a short-barreled shotgun,
the Supreme Court focused solely upon those arms within the scope of the
Second Amendment's protection. 10 7 More importantly, the Court never
stated an individual's membership in a militia or military organization was
a necessary predicate for Second Amendment protection.' 0 8 In fact, the
Court did not discuss whether the individuals in Miller were members of
such organizations. 10 9 Thus, according to the D.C. Circuit, the Second
Amendment's protection was not limited to militia service and an individ-
ual's enjoyment of the right to keep and bear arms did not depend upon
enrollment in the militia. 1 0
106. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 391-95 (analyzing Supreme Court's examinations
of Second Amendment where Court discussed Second Amendment along with in-
dividual rights within Bill of Rights), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); see also Emerson, 270 F.3d at 221
(rejecting Government's argument that Miller endorsed collective right view and
dismissed individual right view).
107. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 393-94 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
178 (1939)) (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Miller that Second Amend-
ment did not guarantee right to keep short-barreled shotgun because weapon was
not part of military equipment and its use did not contribute to common defense),
cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007)
(mem.). Although the Government in Miller argued the Second Amendment's
protection was limited to the ownership and use of arms for service in the militia
or another military organization, the Supreme Court did not decide Miller on this
argument. See id. at 393 (finding Court's rejection of Government's first argument
supports individual right theory); accord Emerson, 270 F.3d at 222-24 (noting Court
decided Miller on basis of Government's argument that "Arms" did not refer to
weapons commonly used by criminals).
108. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 393 (asserting Supreme Court would have men-
tioned defendants were not members of state militia or another military organiza-
tion if Court intended to endorse collective right view in Miller), cert. granted in part
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); accord Emer-
son, 270 F.3d at 224 (observing that Court's opinion in Miller would have men-
tioned defendants were not members of militia nor engaged in military service if
their lack of membership or engagement was decisive). One commentator found
it significant that the Supreme Court's decision in Miller mentioned neither the
"state militia" nor the "National Guard." See GunCite, http://www.guncite.com/
gc2ndsup.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (arguing Miller is often misinterpreted).
109. See, e.g., Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 4 (emphasizing Miller
does not support collective right view, in part because Supreme Court did not
discuss whether individuals were members of military organization).
110. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 395 (holding Second Amendment protects individ-
ual's right), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
645 (2007) (mem.); accord CooLEY, supra note 27, at 282 (finding Second Amend-
ment's right was not limited to members of militia).
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C. Does the Second Amendment Even Apply to the District of Columbia?
In the District's final attempt to save its gun control ordinances, it
argued that it was not subject to the Second Amendment because, first, it
is a federal entity and, second, its local legislation does not interfere with
the security of a free state.'1 1 The D.C. Circuit observed, however, that
the Supreme Court has held the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are
controlling in the District. 1 2 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit did not need
to resolve whether the Second Amendment's guarantee was limited to the
militias of the fifty states because the Second Amendment's protection was
not limited to state militias. 113 Like its state counterparts, the District's
militia was an integral part of maintaining the "security of a free State,"
regardless of whether the District's militia was literally a "state" militia.' 14
The fear that a national standing army threatened individual liberty per-
vaded the thoughts of many eighteenth century Americans, including the
District's residents. 1' 5 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit concluded the Second
Amendment's use of "State" is synonymous with country.116 The Parker
111. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 395 (stating District's argument that District is not
subject to Second Amendment because it is federal entity), cert. granted in part sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.).
112. See id. (citing O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933)) (de-
claring District is subject to Second Amendment). While the Second Amendment
has not been held to be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
D.C. Circuit found the District is a federal district controlled by Congress. See id. at
391 n.13 (explaining District is directly restrained by Bill of Rights, even in absence
of incorporation).
113. See id. at 395-96 (dismissing District's argument that Second Amendment
does not apply in District).
114. See id. at 396 (rejecting District's argument that it is not subject to Sec-
ond Amendment's restraints).
115. See id. at 396-97 (emphasizing that Second Amendment was concerned
with preserving individual liberty so standing army would not be necessary); accord
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) ("The sentiment of the time
strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense
of country and laws could be secured through the Militia[.]"); ALDERMAN & KEN-
NEDY, supra note 12, at 99 ("The tyranny of the British army during colonial times
had made Americans intensely suspicious of military power not subject to civilian
control."). Most delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1787 agreed, how-
ever, that Congress should have the authority to raise an army to protect the gov-
emnment and the nation. See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 99
(discussing that, under Constitution, Congress can declare war, raise army and
summon militia, but states retain power to appoint militia officers and train mem-
bers of militia).
116. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 396 (citing THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 169
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)) (emphasizing James Madison's initial proposal of Sec-
ond Amendment to First Congress provided that well regulated militia was "the
best security of a free country"), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.). Unlike other constitutional provisions that
use the language "the states" or "each state" to refer to an entity such as Penn-
sylvania, the Second Amendment's phrase "a free State" refers to republican gov-
ernment. See id. (explaining use of indefinite article "a" and modifier "free" with
word "State" is unique to Second Amendment).
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dissent, however, agreed with the District and argued the District was not a
state within the meaning of the Second Amendment, and thus the Second
Amendment's reach did not extend to it.1 17
V. THE D.C. CIRCUIT HIT THE TARGET BY RECOGNIZING AN
INDMDUAL'S RIGHT
Examining whether the Second Amendment protects an individual or
collective right does not necessarily define the parameters of the Second
Amendment's protections." 18 In the eighteenth century, the right of "the
people" was not expressly connected to membership in the militia because
the militia consisted of the general citizenry, which the Supreme Court
then defined as "civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion."'1 19 Thus, the
Framers would not have prohibited the use and ownership of weapons for
private purposes because this would have effectively destroyed the ability
of the militia's members to be ready to serve when necessary-a vital as-
pect of the militia's original purpose. 120
117. See id. at 401-06 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (arguing that, like Tenth
Amendment's use of "the people" that refers to individuals of states, and not peo-
ple of District, Second Amendment's use of "the people" is also limited to people
of states and excludes District's citizens). Additionally, Henderson's dissent found
it significant that several constitutional provisions explicitly referring to citizens of
"states" did not apply to the District's citizens. See id. at 406 (citing Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954)) (noting Supreme Court found District was
not state under Fourteenth Amendment). The dissent further argued that, unlike
the states, the District did not need to protect itself from the federal government
because the District was a federal entity created as the government's seat. See id. at
406-07 (asserting Second Amendment's purpose, to calm fear that national stand-
ing army posed threat to individual liberty and sovereignty of states, would not be
furthered if Second Amendment applied in District because District does not need
protection from federal government).
118. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 273 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker,
J., specially concurring) (explaining debate over nature of Second Amendment's
right, whether individual or collective, is "misplaced" and "of no legal significance"
because right to keep and bear arms is subject to "reasonable regulation" and thus
does not always protect possession of arms).
119. See, e.g., Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79 (observing that militia was maintained
and trained by states, and was separate from troops that states could not keep
without consent of Congress).
120. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 394 ("A ban on the use and ownership of weapons
for private purposes, if allowed, would undoubtedly have had a deleterious, if not
catastrophic, effect on the readiness of the militia for action."), cert. granted in part
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); Emerson, 270
F.3d at 235 ("If the people were disarmed there could be no militia."); Lund, Past
and Future, supra note 3, at 61 (commenting that collective right theory cannot be
correct because disarming general citizenry is contrary to meaning of militia at
time of Founding). The eighteenth century militia's existence required and de-
pended upon an individual's ownership of arms. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 394 (argu-
ing First Congress did not intend to distinguish between ownership and use of
arms for private purposes and for militia purposes because militia's survival de-
pended upon individual bringing personal arms when called to serve), cert. granted
in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.);
United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Whether the 'right to
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Due to the federalization of the militia, the Second Amendment's
goal of preserving a well regulated militia may not seem as relevant today
as it was in the eighteenth century when determining whether a firearm
regulation violates the Second Amendment. 121 Nevertheless, the reason
for the Anti-Federalists' fervent fear of the dissolution of an armed citi-
zenry, knowing that "an opening gambit for tyrants is to disarm the pub-
lic," is still pertinent today.122 In 2008,just as the Framers feared in 1787,
disarming the militia would undermine the ability of the people to protect
themselves and their families from criminals, defend the state and resist
an oppressive government.
123
In light of the militia's duty to protect the state, the Emerson decision
illuminates why the D.C. Circuit's holding in Parkerwas correct. 124 Unlike
the gun possessor in Emerson, who was subject to a domestic violence re-
straining order and had threatened to kill several people, the District's
residents wanted to possess "functional firearms" for self-defense. 125 Fur-
thermore, whereas the individual's possession of a gun in Emerson would
have denied the individual's family and others the freedom from threats
of harm, the residents' possession of arms in Parker would further the Sec-
bear arms' for militia purposes is 'individual' or 'collective' in nature is irrelevant
where . . . the individual's possession of arms is not related to the preservation or
efficiency of a militia."); Hardy, supra note 13, at 1243 (emphasizing both individ-
ual and collective right views are correct partly because Second Amendment was
not intended to have single purpose); Dougherty, supra note 29, at 977-78 (ex-
plaining members of militia were required to keep arms).
121. See Spitzer, supra note 8, at 15 ("[T]he concerns that gave rise to the
Second Amendment evaporated as reality changed-that is, as the country turned
away from unorganized or general citizen militias, the Second Amendment was
rendered obsolete."); see also Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 12, at 1003 (observing
that, under sophisticated collective right theory, individual's right to keep and
bear arms no longer exists because militia has disappeared).
122. See Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., spe-
cially concurring) (arguing that, in light of Second Amendment's purpose to
guard against tyranny, individual's right to keep and bear arms should be
recognized).
123. See WILLIAm RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 125-26 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1825) (asserting no clause in Constitu-
tion, particularly Second Amendment, gave Congress power to disarm people).
Rawle noted that the Second Amendment restrains the state government and the
federal government from disarming the people. See id. (noting government's at-
tempt to disarm people "could only be made under some general pretence," but
would be barred by Second Amendment).
124. See generally Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 61 (explaining militia
did not serve only as military force in modern sense); Op. Off. Legal Counsel,
supra note 4, at 33 (noting Second Amendment protects security of freedom in
state, ensuring that individual liberties and rights are secure).
125. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 374 (explaining residents did not assert right to
carry firearms outside their homes; rather, residents wanted "functional firearms"
that were accessible for self-defense in home), cert. granted in part sub nom. District
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 273
(Parker, J., specially concurring) (noting gun owner in Emerson pointed Beretta at
spouse and daughter, cocked hammer at spouse and threatened one employee
and others).
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ond Amendment's purpose by enabling the residents to protect both
themselves and the District against threats of harm in a particularly dan-
gerous city. 126 Though the District defended its gun control ordinances
as reasonable solutions to its high rates of violent crime, the ordinances
did not effectively reduce crime rates; instead, the ordinances destroyed
the ability of the District's residents to lawfully protect the District and its
citizens. 1
27
Unlike past decisions addressing Second Amendment claims, includ-
ing Miller, the D.C. Circuit comprehensively discussed the Second Amend-
ment's history and the right to keep and bear arms as it was understood
and exercised in early America. 12 8 The D.C. Circuit's opinion in Parker is
consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale in Miller, even though the
cases addressed significantly different facts. 129 In contrast to the hand-
guns at issue in Parker, weapons commonly used by private citizens for self-
defense, the shotguns at issue in Millerwere used primarily by criminals.
1 30
Thus, Miller's holding should be read narrowly to approve the regulation
of only those weapons that are rarely used by law-abiding citizens and are
more frequently used by criminals.13 1 As such, the D.C. Circuit correctly
126. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 273 (Parker, J., specially concurring) (declaring
individual's Second Amendment right in Emerson did not supersede rights of indi-
vidual's wife, daughter and others "to be free from bodily harm or threats of
harm"); see also Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 35 (concluding District's
residents furthered Second Amendment's aim, security of free state, by privately
keeping arms to help secure freedom of state and its citizens and by being ready to
serve in militia when necessary).
127. See Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 280 (7th Cir. 1982) (Coffey, J.,
dissenting) ("A fundamental part of our concept of ordered liberty is the right to
protect one's home and family against dangerous intrusions .... "); Robert
Dowlut, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Right to Self-Defense Against Criminals and
Despots, 8 STAN L. & POL'Y REv. 25, 30 (1997) (finding Framers enacted Second
Amendment primarily to protect individual's right of self-defense); David E.
Murley, Private Enforcement of the Social Contract: Deshaney and the Second Amendment
Right to Own Firearms, 36 DUQ. L. REv. 15, 17 (1997) (finding Second Amendment
guarantees individual's right to engage in self-defense); Robert Barnes, Foes of D.C.
Handgun Ban Seek Supreme Court Review, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2007, at B01 (recount-
ing residents' argument that only way District's residents could defend themselves
with rifle for self-defense, after District enacted its gun control ordinances, was by
"throwing" rifle at attacker or by "wielding" rifle as club).
128. See Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Dis-
abilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 157, 164
(1999) [hereinafter Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence] (asserting
opinions of other federal courts addressing Second Amendment claims lacked "in-
tellectual rigor" and were "unnecessarily sweeping").
129. See id. at 166 (characterizing Miller as "highly ambiguous").
130. See id. at 170 (noting weapons at issue in Miller were suited to criminal
uses and were rarely needed for "legitimate civilian purposes"); Lund, Past and
Future, supra note 3, at 72 (explaining "handguns have important functional advan-
tages in self-defense").
131. See Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 128, at
171 (explaining Miller should be read as upholding restrictions "only on weapons
that have the special characteristics shared by those identified in the National Fire-
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determined the District's gun control laws violated the residents' Second
Amendment rights by restricting the possession of weapons that are com-
monly used by private individuals for self-defense.13 2
VI. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Parker creates both positive and nega-
tive precedent for future Second Amendment claims in the D.C. Circuit
and any courts that choose to follow the opinion. 133 The belief that more
guns equals more crime lurks in the background of the debate over the
right to keep and bear arms, and expansively interpreting Parker could
lead to an increase in violent crime rates and provide criminal defendants
with another opportunity to overturn their convictions. 13 4
arms Act of 1934-i.e., slight value to law-abiding citizens and high value to
criminals").
132. See Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 72 (asserting District's ordi-
nances restricting handgun possession infringed individual's right to keep and
bear arms because ordinances forced individual to use rifles and shotguns for self-
defense, and rifles and shotguns are more lethal than handguns); see also 94 C.J.S.
Weapons § 4 (2007) (observing that "arms," when found in constitutional provi-
sions that guarantee right to bear arms for defense of self and state, should not be
limited by historical and military test, but instead should "include arms customarily
kept by law-abiding citizens for their protection").
133. Compare Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 4, at 7-9 (finding that ex-
isting case law does not settle scope of Second Amendment's protection and exam-
ination of Second Amendment's original meaning and text demonstrates Second
Amendment guarantees individual's right to keep and bear arms), with Silveira v.
Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing Fifth Circuit's decision in
Emerson and Justice Department's current position that Second Amendment pro-
tects individual's right has resulted in many challenges to federal statutes that reg-
ulate sale and possession of weapons), Robert Barnes and David Nakamura, D.C.
Case Could Shape Gun Laws; Supreme Court is Asked to Uphold Ban, WASH. POST, Sept.
5, 2007, at A01 (mentioning view that more handguns in home leads to more
violence), and Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 68, at 1 (arguing
D.C. Circuit "made errors of history, errors of law, and errors of logic").
134. See Brandeis Brief Supporting Appellants (Criminology of Firearms) at 1,
Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-7041)
("Underlying the enactments challenged in this case is the quasi-religious faith
that the more guns.., there are, the more violence and death there will be .. ");
Lieber, supra note 7, at 1084-85 (arguing that interpreting Second Amendment as
individual's right gives criminal defendants opportunities to overturn their convic-
tions); Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Second Amendment Fantasy: The D.C.
Circuit's Opinion in the Parker Case, http://www.gunlawsuits.org/defend/second/
fantasy/pdf/parker-opinion-intro.pdf (last visitedJan. 21, 2008) (fearing Parkerwill
be used as "all-purpose excuse for inaction on gun violence"). See generally Barnet,
supra note 65, at 157 (arguing Second Amendment guarantees individual's right to
possess arms for personal protection); Gallia, supra note 4, at 151 (noting that
most convincing argument for prohibiting individuals from keeping and bearing
arms is violence in modern society); Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States De-
partment of Justice, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/guns.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2008) (noting firearm-related crime rates have declined since 1993, but slightly
increased in 2005). For every time a gun is used legally in a home, there are
twenty-two criminal, accidental or suicide-related shootings. See Brady Campaign
to Prevent Gun Violence, Firearm Facts, http://www.bradycampaign.org/issues/
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Ultimately, though, the D.C. Circuit's decision was a step in the right
direction for Second Amendment jurisprudence because it illustrated that
courts should scrutinize firearm regulations, instead of examining an indi-
vidual who brings a Second Amendment claim, as courts do with every
other individual liberty protected in the Bill of Rights.1 35 The D.C. Circuit
correctly interpreted the Second Amendment's history and properly con-
sidered the Second Amendment in light of its purposes of protecting the
country from domestic tyranny and promoting the security of a free
state. 136 While broadly interpreting Parker could backfire, the Supreme
gvstats/firearmoverview/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (asserting that having gun in
one's home poses great risk to family and friends). According to some commenta-
tors, however, high rates of gun ownership result in a decline in the rates of violent
crimes. See Brandeis Brief Supporting Appellants, supra at 5-11 (observing studies
do not conclude more guns leads to more violence, and studies demonstrate, if
anything, opposite correlation); JOHN R. Lo'rr, JR., AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTI-
TUTE, RIGHT-TO-CARRY LAWS AND VIOLENT CRIME REVISITED: CLUSTERING, MEASURE-
MENT ERROR, AND STATE-BY-STATE BREAK DowNs 11 (2004) (finding right-to-carry
laws lead to decline in murder, rape and robbery rates, supporting notion that
more guns equals less violent crime); Lund, Past and Future, supra note 3, at 63
(finding violent crime is not reduced by disarming individuals); Florenz Plassmann
& John Whitley, Comment, Confirming "More Guns, Less Crime, " 55 STAN. L. REV.
1313, 1359 (2003) (explaining states with greatest increases in gun ownership have
experienced greatest declines in burglaries); Political Report from Chris Cox,
NRA-ILA Executive Director (Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.nraila.org/Hunting/
Read/HuntingArticles.aspx?ID=250 ("[B]anning guns does not reduce crime. If
anything, crime increases in jurisdictions that ban guns."). According to one statis-
tic, guns are used three to six times more often to resist criminals than by criminals
in attempting crimes. See Brandeis Brief Supporting Appellants, supra, at 1-2 (argu-
ing modern firearms are most effective means of self-defense). Interestingly, coun-
tries that have strict gun control laws experience a decline in gun-related crime
initially, but then crime rates return to the levels experienced before the gun con-
trol ordinances were enacted. See Gallia, supra note 4, at 155 (observing that Swit-
zerland has one of highest rates of gun ownership in world and has practically zero
gun crime). In recent decades in the United States, the per capita accumulated
stock of firearms has increased, though there has been no consistent increase in
gun violence. See Brandeis Brief Supporting Appellants, supra, at 5 (refuting argu-
ment that more guns equals more death). In the District of Columbia specifically,
five years before the District banned the possession of certain handguns, the mur-
der rate declined from thirty-seven per 100,000 population to twenty-seven per
100,000 population. See id. at 19 (arguing District's handgun prohibition did not
reduce violence). Five years after the enactment of the ordinances, however, the
murder rate increased to thirty-five per 100,000 population and reached levels
lower than the pre-ordinance levels only once. See id. (same).
135. SeeNordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., spe-
cially concurring) (commenting that Supreme Court's recognition of individual's
right to keep and bear arms would place Second Amendment jurisprudence on
"the right track"); see also Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra
note 128, at 165 (arguing courts that have adopted collective right view "have so
casually read the Second Amendment to mean essentially nothing"). See generally
Lieber, supra note 7, at 1085 (noting that if individual right view is widely adopted,
government should bear burden of showing compelling governmental interest in
firearm regulations).
136. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(finding Second Amendment's right "was premised on the private use of arms for
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Court should follow Parkers interpretation of Miller and unambiguously
establish that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to
keep and bear arms, subject to reasonable restrictions. 137
Unless the Court guides the lower courts in interpreting Second
Amendment claims, courts will continue to struggle to determine when, if
ever, an individual's Second Amendment right is violated. 138 Until then,
let us hope the words of John F. Kennedy ring true:
Although it is extremely unlikely that the fears of governmental
tyranny which gave rise to the Second Amendment will ever be a
major danger to our nation, the Amendment still remains an im-
portant declaration of our basic civilian-military relationships
.... For that reason I believe the Second Amendment will always
be important.1 39
Allison L. Mollenhauer
activities such as hunting and self-defense, the latter being understood as resis-
tance to either private lawlessness or the depredations of a tyrannical govern-
ment"), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645
(2007) (mem.).
137. See, e.g., Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 128,
at 164 (arguing, before Emerson was decided, that Fifth Circuit should refuse to
follow other federal courts and should instead correctly interpret Second Amend-
ment as guaranteeing individual's right to keep and bear arms). The government
is not entirely prohibited from regulating the use and ownership of pistols. See
Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (noting Second Amendment is subject to same "reasonable
restrictions" that limit First Amendment), cert. granted in part sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (mem.). In certain circumstances, the
Second Amendment is not violated when individuals are deprived of their right to
keep and bear arms. See, e.g., United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266-67 (3d Cir.
1942) (finding statute proscribing receipt of weapons from interstate commerce by
anyone convicted of violent crime did not violate Second Amendment), rev'd on
other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). For instance, a regulation that promotes the
government's interest in public safety is a reasonable restriction of the Second
Amendment's right because it does not impair conduct the right was intended to
protect. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (listing reasonable regulations of weapons), cert.
granted in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007)
(mem.). Additionally, reasonable restrictions are consistent with preserving a well
regulated militia because individual characteristics that render gun ownership dan-
gerous to society, such as insanity or felonious conduct, also render an individual
unsuitable for serving in the militia. See, e.g., id. (noting registration of firearms is
consistent with well regulated militia because registration provides government
with information about how many people would be armed if called for militia ser-
vice); United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 437-38 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding statute
prohibiting possession of firearm after defendant's conviction of misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence did not violate Second Amendment); see also Memoran-
dum from the Office of the Attorney General to all United States Attorneys, supra
note 14 (asserting reasonable restrictions on Second Amendment's right can be
imposed to prevent "unfit persons" from owning arms and to limit ownership of
arms "particularly suited to criminal misuse").
138. See Gallia, supra note 4, at 161 (emphasizing that Supreme Court should
decide exactly what right Second Amendment guarantees).
139. John F. Kennedy, Know Your Lawmakers, GUNS, Apr. 1960, at 4.
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